Znaczenie układu poczdamskiego dla kwestii ewentualnych praw Polski do rekompensaty od Niemiec z tytułu wojny i okupacji

Problemy Współczesnego Prawa Międzynarodowego, Europejskiego i Porównawczego 2023, t. 21, s. 153-182.

Niniejszy tekst analizuje postanowienia układu poczdamskiego dotyczące odszkodowań. Autor stara się skonfrontować je z podstawowymi normami prawa międzynarodowego. Są to reguły odpowiedzialności międzynarodowej państw i reguły dotyczące zrzeczenia się w prawie międzynarodowym. Ich analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że bezpodstawne są tezy próbujące dopatrywać się w układzie poczdamskim rodzaju zrzeczenia się. W każdym razie nie pozbawia on żadnego państwa-ofiary II wojny światowej autonomicznego prawa do domagania się odszkodowania od Niemiec za wszelkie naruszenia prawa międzynarodowego i to niezależnie od zawarcia traktatu w tej kwestii. Nie ma też najmniejszych argumentów natury prawnej, by w układzie poczdamskim dopatrywać się źródła przejścia odpowiedzialności międzynarodowej z Niemiec na ZSRR. Tekst niniejszy porusza też kwestię tego, jak właściwe zrozumienie układu poczdamskiego wpływa na kwestię tzw. jednostronnego zrzeczenia się odszkodowań przez Polskę z 1953 r. i układu „dwa plus cztery”. W świetle tzw. pierwszej formuły Barcza/Kranza staje się bowiem jasne, że tzw. zrzeczenie się odszkodowań przez Polskę z 1953 r. może odnosić się tylko i wyłącznie od roszczeń z zakresu układu poczdamskiego.

Presented text analyses the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement dealing with damages. The author tries to apply to them the basic norms of public international law. They are namely the rules on state responsibility and the rules dealing with waiver. The conclusion is that it seems impossible to see a kind of waiver in the Potsdam Agreement. It leaves intact the autonomous right of every victim-state to get compensation from Germany for all breaches of public international law. It is also impossible to see any kind of transition of responsibility from Germany to the Soviet Union as regards the rights of compensation for Poland. Th e text discusses the influence of proper understanding of the Potsdam Agreement for the so-called Polish waiver of 1953 and ‘2 plus 4’ Agreement. The co-called first Barcz-Kranz formula makes it clear that the so-called Polish waiver of 1953 may apply only to Potsdam Agreement claims and leaves the matter open in Polish-German legal relations.

The Choice of the Paradigm of Discussion on the Right of Poland to Obtain Compensation From Germany Because of the WWII Aggression and Occupation

Eastern European Journal of Transnational Relations 2021, t. 5, nr 1, s. 39-54.

The text is devoted to the choice of the paradigm of discussion on the right of Poland to obtain compensation from Germany in connection with the Second World War. In the opinion of the author the main failure of the hitherto discussion on the rights of Poland vis-a-vis Germany is a very infrequent reference to the rules on state responsibility. They are simple and lead to a very simple conclusion – namely the obligation of international law to pay a compensation which would wipe out all the consequences of the breach of international law. The author analyses in more detail the influence of the Potsdam Agreement and the 1953 declaration of the government of the Polish People’s Republic. In his opinion, the Potsdam Agreement had no adverse effect on the scope of the Polish rights. While it is impossible to deny such an influence of the 1953 declaration, the author shows that even on a very wide interpretation it cannot be seen as a definitive end of all rights of Poland. The main message is that it is the set of psychological errors on the Polish side which make the discussion on the Polish rights so diffi cult and unfruitful.

The Execution of European Arrest Warrants Issued by Polish Courts in the Context of the Cjeu Rule of Law Case Law

Polish Yearbook of International Law 2020, t. XXXX, s. 275–295.

The case law of the CJEU dealing with the rule of law touches upon the question of execution of European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) issued by Polish courts. The year 2020 witnessed the second important judgment of the CJEU in this respect (the Dutch case). As in its 2018 predecessor (the Irish case), the CJEU excluded the possibility of overt denial of all EAWs issued by Polish courts. Instead it insists on a two-step examination, comprising not only a general evaluation but also the examination of the individual situation of a requested person. It remains to be seen whether this is a promise of armistice in the CJEU’s approach to Poland, although this is not believed by the author of the text.

The Sources of General International Law in the Recent Works of the International Law Commission

Polish Yearbook of International Law 2019, t. XXXIX, s. 37-60.

The present text describes the attitude toward sources of law in the recent works of the International Law Commission (ILC) on custom, general principles of law, and jus cogens (with special emphasis on reports of the respective special rapporteurs). The three main tasks of the text are to verify whether the ILC rapporteurs: grasped the essence of unwritten sources (reality-concern); preserved the coherence of views when referring to different topics (coherence-concern); and last but not least allow states to have the decisive voice as regards the set of their obligations (sovereignty-concern). The author notes the nominal strict attachment of the ILC to two-element nature of custom as a general practice recognized as law. Though in fact it should be a good message for states, this strict attitude of the ILC seems not to be based on a real stress test. It seems to ignore the reality of lawyers and even international judges referring to several customary norms without the slightest attempt to verify the true existence of both the two elements of custom – namely practice and opinio juris. What is more, the ILC does not see any problem with calling all general principles as sources of law. What is overlooked is the element of state consent to be bound by several presumed general principles. This is qualified by the author as a threat to state sovereignty – with states being pressured to follow some patterns of conduct to which they have not given their consent.

The Theoretical Problem of Sources of International Law

Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics 2018, t. 8, nr 2, str. 12-35.

There is no doubt that sources of law deserve attention nowadays. One can expect that the lawyers will have to face two fundamental problems. One of them is a real problem. It has to do with the relationship between customary norms and general principles of law. The basic question is whether the latter form a separate group of sources. If so, what are the means of establishing their existence? The second problem is rather a question of definition. It is rather a reflection of the inclusion of all treaties into the notion of sources of international law? If so, the question is why to deny this notion to some unilateral acts of states? If we include the latter, the question is why to deny this notion to other unilateral acts of states?

General Principles of Law in Public International Law

Polish Yearbook of International Law 2017, t. 37, s. 243-254.

Thi­s arti­cle di­scusses the classi­cal questi­on­ whether gen­eral pri­n­ci­ples of law form a separate source of i­n­tern­ati­on­al law. To thi­s en­d i­t adopts the method of a posteri­ori­ an­alysi­s, exami­n­i­n­g the n­ormati­ve n­ature of vari­ous pri­n­ci­ples of law on­e by on­e. Thi­s an­alysi­s leads to the con­clusi­on­ that on­ly some pri­n­ci­ples have a n­ormati­ve n­ature, whi­le others lack i­t.

International Responsibility and the Systemic Character of International Law

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 2017, t. 52, nr 1, s. 229-245.

The question whether international law is a system is one of the modern topics discussed by specialists of international law. The text of P. Saganek poses this question with respect to the rules on international responsibility. The two aims are to establish whether the rules on state responsibility are a system themselves and whether they may prima facie support the idea of international law as such a system. The two prima facie answers are positive. Every violation of international law gives rise to state responsibility if it can be attributed to a state and no circumstance precluding wrongfulness is in place. In this sense the rules on state responsibility form a sub-system supporting the thesis on the systemic nature of international law. On a closer analysis one can encounter several doubts as to both answers. Paradoxically those rules are too ideal, too systemic. The author – without denying the necessity of several if not the majority of the identified rules – refers to a tendency of presenting as law some non-binding documents prepared by expert groups. This is a part of a wider process of ‘paper-law’. In this sense expert groups engage in ‘creating the language’ in which the true subjects of international law are expected to speak.

Współczesny kryzys migracyjny a uwarunkowania międzynarodowoprawne

Studia Prawnicze 2016, nr 3, s. 67-98.

The text of Przemysław Saganek is a part of a wider discussion on the Mediterranean migration crisis. The author underlines the multi-aspect character of the crisis and the fact that several branches of international law which are at stake in it. They cover: the law on refugees, human rights, the law of the sea, the maritime law, the rules on territorial sovereignty and on the crossing of borders. What is of importance are customary norms, treaties and norms of the EU law. The idea of the author is to look at the instruments of international law which may act as incentive for hundreds of thousands of newcomers or as main obstacles for the states to put an end to uncontrolled inflow of people through their borders. His idea is to identify such instruments and start discussion on their possible suspension or termination if the crisis persists. The author comes to the conclusion that the definition of a refugee from the 1951 Geneva Conventionis not by itself a source of problems. The same concerns the subsidiary protection as introduced by the EU qualification directive. The same can be said about the scope of rights of persons covered by the international protection. The only element which requires discussion is the possible redefinition of the right to national treatment as regards the social aid. On the other hand, the scope of powers of states to defend their borders depends on the interpretation of the EU instruments on the protection of borders and the rights of applicants for international protection. The author comes to the conclusion that neither the procedural directive, nor the 2016 Schengen Border Code can be interpreted as a source of the right of an applicant to enter the territory of a Member State. On the other hand, the geographical conditions and the law of the sea make Greece and Italy the most vulnerable for the inflow of persons. The necessity of important changes to the law and its interpretation are referred to in a general way.

Nowe reguły dotyczące podziału kompetencji między Unię Europejską a państwa członkowskie w świetle Traktatu z Lizbony

Przegląd Sejmowy 2010, nr 4, s. 83-106.

Unilateral Acts in Polish-German Relations

Polish Yearbook of International Law 2009, t. 29, s. 85-113.

The paper is devoted in fact to two unilateral acts. The first of them is the statementof chancellor Schröder made in Warsaw on 1 August, 2004. The second is the state-ment of the Polish government on the waiver of payments of German reparationsmade on 23 August, 1953.The first statement is generally believed to be an act of legal importance. The elementthat attaches the utmost importance is the promise of the German government to presentbefore international courts the critical evaluation of individual claims of former owners ofland on the territories that came under the Polish sovereignty after the Second World War.The elements of that evaluation embrace the conclusions according to which: “there couldbe no room for the restitution claims from Germany”, such claims would “put the historyupside down”, “proprietary problems connected with the Second World War are no long-er a subject for the two governments” and “neither the federal government nor any seriouspolitical force in Germany support such claims if they are nevertheless put”. There couldbe no room for doubt as to the legal force of that statement. Its descriptive style orinclusion of elements upon which the government has only limited or no influence at all(the behavior of political parties or individuals) cannot change the binding force ofstatements relating to the German state as such. In fact the statement is not onlya promise. I contains also the elements of waiver and recognition (as to the fact that thereis no longer a subject of claims and that they would put the history upside down). Thewaiver results from the same sentences. It is limited to claims made on the state level only. The individual ones are not cancelled as such. If they are however made and notsatisfied there is no longer a possibility to put them on the level of states.The second act made in 1953 is also quite general. Although from the historicalperspective there could be no doubt regarding the interrelationship between that act andthe USSR-GDR agreement, the statement of the Polish government did not refer to thelatter expressly. The author analyses critically the arguments aimed at the justificationof the nullity of the act presented in the previous literature. In his opinion it would bevery difficult (if possible at all) to put into question the legal force of the act. Theauthor however is not prepared to accept the erection of the Chinese wall between thewaiver and other international acts giving rise to the obligations of the author. In thatcontext he refers to the rebus sic stantibus argument according to which the presenta-tion of claims on the side of Germany could justify the new evaluation of the resultsof the war for the Polish state and nation. That solution would not be happy for anyparty nor for the stability of law, but it could be perceived as an extreme solution forthe most extreme course of events.

Dostęp do usług medycznych w innych państwach członkowskich w świetle orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego i Międzynarodowego 2008, nr 2, s. 59-78.

Rozporządzenie wspólnotowe o spółdzielni europejskiej (SCE)

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 2004, nr 2, s. 74-78.

Uwagi na tle komunikatu Komisji Europejskiej "Budowa wspólnej przyszłości"

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 2004, nr 3, s. 70-75.

Orzeczenia Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości

Orzecznictwo Sądowe w Sprawach Gospodarczych 2004, nr 5, s. 90-97.

Orzeczenia Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości.

Orzecznictwo Sądów Apelacyjnych 2002, nr 1, s. 79-84.

Legal instruments of the Act of Accession

Polish Yearbook of International Law 2002/2003, t. 26, s. 47-66.

Orzeczenia Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości

Orzecznictwo Sądów Apelacyjnych 2002, nr 3, s. 80-85.

Dyrektywy nowego podejścia a problem dostosowania prawa polskiego do prawa Unii Europejskiej : (wybrane zagadnienia)

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 2001, nr 2, s. 39-58.

Transition to the Second Stage of the Association between Poland and the European Communities and Their Member States

Polish Yearbook of International Law 2001, t. 25, s. 149-173.

Ochrona konsumentów we Wspólnotach Europejskich

Orzecznictwo Sądów w Sprawach Gospodarczych 2000, nr 10, s. 108-135.

Europejski Trybunał Sprawiedliwości : orzeczenia z zakresy rynku wewnętrznego

Orzecznictwo Sądów w Sprawach Gospodarczych 2000, nr 11, s. 111-137.

Europejski Trybunał Sprawiedliwości : orzeczenia dotyczące swobody przepływu pracowników

Orzecznictwo Sądów w Sprawach Gospodarczych 2000, nr 12, s. 109-136.

Ekstraterytorialne stosowanie prawa Wspólnot Europejskich

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 1997, nr 1, s. 41-54.

Kompetencja Wspólnoty Europejskiej do zawierania umów międzynarodowych

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 1997, nr 2, s. 66-82.

Przegląd Orzecznictwa Trybunału Wspólnot Europejskich

1996, nr 1, s. 116-126.