Wyrok Trybunału Sprawiedliwości wydany w trybie art. 267 TFUE nie może być podstawą wznowienia postępowania zgodnie z art. 401[1] k.p.c. : glosa do wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości z 9.04.2024 r., C-582/21, FY przeciwko Profi Credit Polska S.A.

Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 2025, nr 2, s. 23-39.

W wyroku w sprawie C-582/21, Profi Credit Polska, Trybunał Sprawiedliwości odrzucił możliwość uznania, że wyrok wydany w trybie art. 267 Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej może być podstawą wznowienia postępowania na podstawie art. 401[1] Kodeksu postępowania cywilnego. Jednocześnie TS wskazał, pozostawiając ostateczną ocenę sądowi krajowemu, że środki prawne gwarantujące konsumentowi ochronę wymaganą przez dyrektywę 93/13/EWG powinny być zapewniane przy zastosowaniu wykładni zgodnej odpowiednich przepisów proceduralnych, tj. art. 401 pkt 2 k.p.c. Gdyby wykładnia taka nie była możliwa, ochrona ta powinna być gwarantowana w ramach postępowania egzekucyjnego lub późniejszego odrębnego postępowania. Glosowany wyrok dotyczy fundamentalnych kwestii prawa unijnego, jak zasada pewności prawa i stanowiąca jej wyraz zasada powagi rzeczy osądzonej, zasada pierwszeństwa, ograniczenia zasady autonomii proceduralnej państw członkowskich, obowiązek wykładni zgodnej czy rola procedury pytań prejudycjalnych w systemie prawa unijnego. Jednocześnie niezwykle istotne pozostaje praktyczne znaczenie glosowanego wyroku widoczne w kontekście takich zagadnień jak zakres nadzwyczajnych środków zaskarżenia odwołujących się do prawa unijnego czy prawo konsumenta do środka prawnego zapewniającego skuteczną ochronę uprawnień wywodzonych z prawa UE. Wyrok C-582/21, Profi Credit Polska, zawiera cenne wskazówki odnośnie do tego, jakimi instrumentami prawnymi dysponuje (powinna dysponować) strona dochodząca uprawnień unijnych przed sądem krajowym i jakie granice wynikają w tym względzie z ogólnych zasad prawa unijnego, jego cech i elementów struktury prawnej UE.

In its judgment in C-582/21, Profi Credit Polska, the Court of Justice held that a judgment issued under Article 267 TFEU cannot constitute a basis for reopening the proceedings under Article 401[1] of the Code of Civil Procedure. Simultaneously, leaving the final assessment to the national court, the CJEU pointed out that legal remedies guaranteeing a consumer the protection required by Directive 93/13/EEC should be ensured by interpreting the relevant procedural provisions, i.e. Article 401 point 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in conformity with EU law. Should such an interpretation not be possible, this protection should be ensured in enforcement proceedings or in separate subsequent proceedings. This judgment applies to fundamental issues of EU law, such as the principle of legal certainty and the principle of res judicata, the principle of primacy, limitations of the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with the requirements of EU law or the role of the preliminary ruling procedure in the system of EU law. At the same time, this judgment is especially important in practice in the context of such issues as the scope of extraordinary remedies referring to EU law or the consumer’s right to legal measures guaranteeing effective protection of rights derived from EU law. The judgment in C-582/21, Profi Credit Polska, offers valuable guidance as to which legal instruments are (or should be) available to a party seeking protection of EU rights before a national court and the limits arising, in this respect, from the general principles of EU law, its features and elements of the EU legal structure.

Wspólna Izba Sądów Najwyższych i Trybunałów UE jako rozwiązanie sporu o „ostatnie słowo” w porządku konstytucyjnym UE?

Prawo i Więź 2025, nr 6 (59), s. 119-136.

The European Convention on Human Rights primarily protects civil and political rights; however, according to the European Court of Human Rights, its interpretation “may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights.” This paper aims to analyse the relationship between the applicant’s status as vulnerable or as belonging to a vulnerable group, and the extension of the Convention’s protection into the domain of social rights. The research focuses on judgments and decisions of the ECtHR concerning the social dimension of rights enshrined in Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, in which the concept of vulnerability is invoked. The paper examines how the Court applies the concept of vulnerability and assesses its impact on the outcome of the case.

Wyrok TK w sprawie K 3/21 a zasada pierwszeństwa prawa unijnego : (perspektywa pluralizmu konstytucyjnego)

Państwo i Prawo 2024, nr 3, s. 3-27.

Istotą aktualnego sporu między TK i TS nie jest konflikt między zasadą nadrzędności Konstytucji a zasadą pierwszeństwa prawa unijnego, lecz odpowiedź na pytanie, w świetle jakich wartości konstytucyjnych uzasadnione jest stanowisko aprobujące bądź kwestionujące wyroki Trybunału Sprawiedliwości. Innymi słowy, jaka idea konstytucjonalizmu wyznacza rozstrzygnięcie sądu konstytucyjnego: czy jest to konstytucjonalizm liberalny - stawiający w centrum ochronę praw jednostki - zbieżny z założeniami aksjologicznymi orzecznictwa TS, czy nieliberalny - kwestionujący imperatyw kontroli władzy publicznej przez niezależne sądy. Taka konkluzja wydaje się uprawniona w świetle analizy wyroku K 3/21, w szczególności zawartych tam odwołań do orzecznictwa TK sprzed 2016 dotyczących relacji Konstytucji i prawa unijnego, dokonywanej przez pryzmat pluralizmu konstytucyjnego.

Numerous commentaries on the current dispute between the CJ and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (CT), of which CT judgment in case K 3/21 in particular has become an expression, identify the CT’s questioning of the principle of primacy of EU law, established in CJ case law, as the core of the conflict. This opinion is formulated from the point of view of EU law. Meanwhile – from the perspective of Polish constitutional law – the paradigm developed in the pre-2016 case law of the CJ seems more appropriate for an assessment of the dispute. In this article, this perspective is the starting point for the assessment of CT judgment in case K 3/21. Seen from this perspective, the essence of the current dispute between the CJ and the CT is not a conflict between the principle of supremacy of the Constitution and that of primacy of EU law, but the question: in the light of which constitutional values is a position approving or challenging the judgments of the CJ justified. In other words – what idea of constitutionalism underpins the determination made by the constitutional court? Is it liberal constitutionalism – which places protection of individual rights at the centre, consistently with the axiological assumptions of CJ case law – or illiberal constitutionalism – which questions the imperative of control of public authority by independent courts? Such framing of the issue is made possible by an analysis the K 3/21 judgment, in particular the references made in it to the pre-2016 case law of the CT on the relationship between the Constitution and EU law, from the point of view of assumptions of constitutional pluralism.

Equality of Member States as a New Rationale for the Principle of Primacy and Its Significance for the Constitutionalisation of EU Law

Polish Yearbook of International Law 2024, t. 44, s. 235-251.

In its recent jurisprudence the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has indicated new grounds for the principle of primacy of EU law: the equality of Member States before the Treaties. This reflects the view that the principle of primacy should not be perceived within a bilateral framework – as a means of resolving conflicts between two legal orders (EU and national) – but in a multilateral context, where uniformity, equality and primacy are strongly intertwined. The aim of this paper will be to analyse and assess the CJEU stance on this new foundation of the principle of primacy. It will be argued that the CJEU seeking justification for the principle of primacy in arguments of an axiological nature, not only functional ones, is expected and justified after the Treaty of Lisbon and in the face of the current threats to the values embedded in Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union. It is crucial for further strengthening of the processes of constitutionalisation of EU law. However, controversy may arise from the views that such new argumentation on the rationale of the primacy principle already resolves the competing claims of final authority in the EU.

The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Case Law of the Polish Constitutional Court : The Current Breakdown in View of Polish Constitutional Jurisprudence Pre-2016

Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2023, t. 15, s. 19-49.

The current crisis in the relationship between the Polish Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) is of crucial significance for the process of regional integration based on the values of liberal democracy taking place in the EU. The constitutional crisis in Poland that began in the end of 2015 has challenged the systemic position of the Polish Constitutional Court. It resulted in a new model of constitutional adjudication, and in this new model the Constitutional Court, stripped of its counter-majoritarian power, cannot be perceived as the guardian of liberal democracy. This article postulates that the assessment of the present case law of the Polish Constitutional Court in European matters is made through the prism of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence pre-2016 (i.e. before the constitutional crisis). Based on that assumption, the current reversal in the case law of the Polish Constitutional Court concerning the ECJ is analysed and assessed. It is argued that the root cause of the constitutional crisis in Poland is the departure from the principles of liberal democracy in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which are foundational - in light of the assumptions of the integration process - for the axiological identity of the EU and its Member States. This article also shows how the principles and concepts developed in the Polish constitutional jurisprudence pre-2016 could have served to avoid the current conflict with the ECJ, and how those notions are misused in the current jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Court.