Wyrok TK w sprawie K 3/21 a zasada pierwszeństwa prawa unijnego : (perspektywa pluralizmu konstytucyjnego)

Państwo i Prawo 2024, nr 3, s. 3-27.

Istotą aktualnego sporu między TK i TS nie jest konflikt między zasadą nadrzędności Konstytucji a zasadą pierwszeństwa prawa unijnego, lecz odpowiedź na pytanie, w świetle jakich wartości konstytucyjnych uzasadnione jest stanowisko aprobujące bądź kwestionujące wyroki Trybunału Sprawiedliwości. Innymi słowy, jaka idea konstytucjonalizmu wyznacza rozstrzygnięcie sądu konstytucyjnego: czy jest to konstytucjonalizm liberalny - stawiający w centrum ochronę praw jednostki - zbieżny z założeniami aksjologicznymi orzecznictwa TS, czy nieliberalny - kwestionujący imperatyw kontroli władzy publicznej przez niezależne sądy. Taka konkluzja wydaje się uprawniona w świetle analizy wyroku K 3/21, w szczególności zawartych tam odwołań do orzecznictwa TK sprzed 2016 dotyczących relacji Konstytucji i prawa unijnego, dokonywanej przez pryzmat pluralizmu konstytucyjnego.

Numerous commentaries on the current dispute between the CJ and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (CT), of which CT judgment in case K 3/21 in particular has become an expression, identify the CT’s questioning of the principle of primacy of EU law, established in CJ case law, as the core of the conflict. This opinion is formulated from the point of view of EU law. Meanwhile – from the perspective of Polish constitutional law – the paradigm developed in the pre-2016 case law of the CJ seems more appropriate for an assessment of the dispute. In this article, this perspective is the starting point for the assessment of CT judgment in case K 3/21. Seen from this perspective, the essence of the current dispute between the CJ and the CT is not a conflict between the principle of supremacy of the Constitution and that of primacy of EU law, but the question: in the light of which constitutional values is a position approving or challenging the judgments of the CJ justified. In other words – what idea of constitutionalism underpins the determination made by the constitutional court? Is it liberal constitutionalism – which places protection of individual rights at the centre, consistently with the axiological assumptions of CJ case law – or illiberal constitutionalism – which questions the imperative of control of public authority by independent courts? Such framing of the issue is made possible by an analysis the K 3/21 judgment, in particular the references made in it to the pre-2016 case law of the CT on the relationship between the Constitution and EU law, from the point of view of assumptions of constitutional pluralism.

Equality of Member States as a New Rationale for the Principle of Primacy and Its Significance for the Constitutionalisation of EU Law

Polish Yearbook of International Law 2024, t. 44, s. 235-251.

In its recent jurisprudence the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has indicated new grounds for the principle of primacy of EU law: the equality of Member States before the Treaties. This reflects the view that the principle of primacy should not be perceived within a bilateral framework – as a means of resolving conflicts between two legal orders (EU and national) – but in a multilateral context, where uniformity, equality and primacy are strongly intertwined. The aim of this paper will be to analyse and assess the CJEU stance on this new foundation of the principle of primacy. It will be argued that the CJEU seeking justification for the principle of primacy in arguments of an axiological nature, not only functional ones, is expected and justified after the Treaty of Lisbon and in the face of the current threats to the values embedded in Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union. It is crucial for further strengthening of the processes of constitutionalisation of EU law. However, controversy may arise from the views that such new argumentation on the rationale of the primacy principle already resolves the competing claims of final authority in the EU.