Prof. dr hab. Monika Szwarc stopień doktora nauk prawnych uzyskała w 2004 r. w Instytucie Nauk Prawnych PAN na podstawie rozprawy doktorskiej „Konstrukcja współpracy zacieśnionej w Unii Europejskiej” (promotor prof. dr hab. Władysław Czapliński). Stopień doktora habilitowanego nauk prawnych uzyskała w INP PAN w 2012 r. na podstawie rozprawy habilitacyjnej „Kompetencje Unii Europejskiej w dziedzinie harmonizacji prawa karnego materialnego” (Warszawa 2011). Tytuł profesora uzyskała w 2022 r. Związana z Instytutem Nauk Prawnych od 2004 r. jako adiunkt, następnie jako profesor INP PAN (2012-2022), obecnie jako profesor tytularny (od 2022 r.). Kierowniczka Zakładu Prawa Europejskiego (od 2018r.). Zastępczyni Przewodniczącej Rady Naukowej INP PAN 2023-2026. Stypendystka m.in. Fundacji van Calkera (2003), Fundacji „Centrum Europejskie Natolin” (2006), Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego (2009-2011) oraz Narodowego Centrum Nauki (2018-2023). W latach 2005-2020 członkini kolegium redakcyjnego „Europejskiego Przeglądu Sądowego”, od 2021 r. – redaktor naczelna „Studiów Prawniczych”.
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FORMA
GLOSA

Enforcement of EU Law : effectiveness and Fundamental Rights as Limits to the Ius Puniendi Exercised by Member States in Fiscal (Criminal) Proceedings

Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 2023, vol. 28, nr 4, s. 53-68.

This article analyses the limits to Member States’ powers in the field of enforcing (criminal) penalties for infringements of EU law, with particular focus on the protection of the EU’s financial interests. The article addresses the issue of the broad interpretation of the concept of ‘fraud’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the PFI Convention, which resulted in imposing an obligation on Member States to establish criminal penalties for certain serious VAT fraud. Next, the article analyses the requirements of effectiveness and equivalence of penalties established in domestic law for infringements of EU law, which may affect not only the severity of penalties, but also the rules of criminal procedure (limitation periods in pre-trial and judicial proceedings). Finally, the article presents the main developments in the context of limitations of ius puniendi, which stem from the obligation to protect fundamental rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Primacy and direct effect - still together : Popławski II

Common Market Law Review 2021, vol. 58, nr 2, s. 571-590.

Współautorstwo: Miąsik, Dawid

The Application of EU Law by Polish Courts : general Remarks on 15 Years of Experience

Contemporary Central & East European Law 2019, nr 1, s. 21-32.

Współautorstwo: Domańska, Monika; Miąsik, Dawid

The Court of Justice of the European Union operates on a case-by-case basis. This means that its decisions normally relate to specific problems occurring in a specific Member State. Consequently it is often hard to ‘translate’ this case law into the national legal system of a different Member State. Nevertheless the case law of the Court of Justice has consequences not only for the individual Member States. It also has harmonising effects. In this sense, the principles of primacy and of direct effect of EU provisions, as well as the obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU law, operate as the minimum requirements which the legal systems of Member States must fulfil. Poland joined the European Union in May 2004. At that time the number of Member States increased to 25. The existence of avenues of judicial protection in the EU raised a number of questions from the very beginning. Now, after 15 years of experience it is time to consider the standard of application of EU law by Polish courts.

Effectiveness of EU law and protection of fundamental rights : in search of balance in the context of the ne bis in idem principle

Studia Prawnicze 2019, nr 4 (220), s. 37-58.

The article undertakes the current and important issue of balancing between the Member States’ obligations to ensure effectiveness of EU law and to respect fundamental rights, taking as an example the ne bis in idem principle, enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The recent case law of the CJEU in Di Puma, Garlsson and others and Menci is analysed. These rulings exemplify the growing importance of the issue of how to balance the two obligations in a situation when the repression undertaken by a Member State in order to ensure the full effect of EU law may infringe a fundamental right provided for in the Charter. The main objective is thus to formulate proposals on how to balance these interests, as well as to define their consequences for national courts.

Łączne zastosowanie sankcji administracyjnych i karnych w świetle zasady ne bis in idem

Państwo i Prawo 2017, nr 12 (862), s. 43-56.

Zakres związania państw członkowskich Kartą Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej w kontekście stosowania prawa karnego : (uwagi na tle orzecznictwa TSUE)

Studia Prawnicze 2017, nr 3, s. 47-79.

The article focuses on the recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of the national criminal laws of the Member States, concerning the scope of application of the Charter. Drawing conclusions from this jurisprudence the Author answers the question when the Member State is 'implementing Union law' in the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter in the criminal law context. It is considered that Member States implement Union law when interpreting framework decisions (Lanigan, JZ, Vilkas), when assessing the conformity of the national measures with framework decisions (Jeremy F., Radu), when executing judgements in the framework of the mutual recognition (Aranyosi and Caldararu) and when assuring the effectiveness of EU law by enacting criminal sanctions (Tarrico). In addition, in some situations Member States may be considered to be implementing Union law while enacting national measures which may affect the rights derived from Union law (Delvigne). It is assumed in the article that CJEU is often called to strike the fair balance between the different (and sometimes diverging) interests of three categories of actors: interests of individuals (to have their fundamental rights protected), interests of Member States (to exercise ius puniendi) and interests of the European Union as a whole (to ensure effectivess of EU law).

Wpływ orzecznictwa TS na prawo karne UE

Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 2014, nr 1, s. 95-100.

Ograniczenia prawa dostępu do dokumentów instytucji Unii Europejskiej na podstawie rozporządzenia 1049/2001 w sprawie publicznego dostępu do dokumentów

Studia Prawnicze 2013, nr 2, s. 163-195.

The article undertakes the issue of lawful exceptions to the right of public access to EU documents under Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. The author analyses the jurisprudence of the General Court and the Court of Justice as regards the interpretation of these exceptions. The article covers obligatory as well as facultative exceptions in public or private interest, exception connected with the protection of the decision-making processes in the EU institutions and the issue of Member States’ documents, which are in possession of EU institutions. The author argues that there have been so far important differences in jurisprudence of the General Court and the Court of Justice in a number of important issues, such as the balance between the public access to documents and respect of privacy. The approach of the EU courts in also highlighted in respect of Member States’ documents – the author draws a conclusion that when the documents drawn by the Member States are transmitted to the UE institutions, the public access to these documents does no longer belong to the national law but to the EU law. In particular, eventual denial to access such documents must be based on exceptions from Article 4 of the Regulation 1049/2001, and not on national law. This results in extending the scope of application of the EU rules on public access to documents.

Zasada niedyskryminacji ze względu na obywatelstwo a odmowa wykonania ENA wydanego w celu odbycia kary : (uwagi na tle art. 4 pkt 6 decyzji ramowej 2002/584)

Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 2013, nr 5, s. 11-18.

Ewolucja definicji środka o skutku równoważnym do ograniczeń ilościowych w orzecznictwie TS - od Dassonville do Mickelsson : przegląd orzecznictwa

Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 2012, nr 1, s. 31-37.

Legal Nature of European Union Agricultural Penalties

eucrim. The European Criminal Law Associations' Forum 2012, nr 4, s. 170–174.

Współautorstwo: Łacny, Justyna

Excluding a farmer from receiving a single area payment in a given year and reducing the payment he could claim within the following years, imposed as a penalties for the breach of the EU agricultural provisions, do not constitute criminal sanctions. They are specific administrative instruments applied against the farmer who had decided to participate in an agricultural aid scheme. In such a case, the ne bis in idem principle does not apply. Thus, exclusion and reduction of agricultural payments do not preclude sentencing the farmer in criminal proceeding for the same breach of the EU agricultural provisions. This conclusion follows from the judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered on 5 June 2012 in case C-489/10 criminal proceedings against Ł. Bonda.

Spółdzielnia Europejska : spółdzielczość na rynku wewnętrznym Unii Europejskiej

Pieniądze i Więź 2011, nr 4, s. 98-107.

Harmonizacja znamion przestępstw i kar w Traktacie z Lizbony

Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 2009, nr 5, s. 10-17.

Traktat z Lizbony : reforma czy jej pozory?

Studia Prawnicze 2008, nr 1, s. 5-63.

Współautorstwo: Kowalik-Bańczyk, Krystyna

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13th December 2007 by representatives of 27 EU Member States after almost three years of incertitude as to the further fate of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe (2004). It significantly amends the present Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (which would be renamed as the "Treaty on functioning of the European Union") and should enter into force on 1 January 2009, after all Member States have deposited the instruments of ratification. The modifications introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in many aspects reflect the changes agreed in the Treaty establish ing the Constitution for Europe, however it does not constitute a s of the latter Treaty. Some important provisions of the Constitution for Europe were a simple repetition not inserted into the amending treaty in order to reduce the risk of "non-ratification" (with the main examples of the clause of primacy or Minister of Foreign Affaires). On the other hand some new solutions, not provided in the Constitutional Treaty, were added to the Lisbon Treaty, for the same reason. The main aim of the article is to point out and assess the modifications introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in respect both to the present legal situation and to the solu tions proposed in the Constitution for Europe. The authors undertake a task to evaluate the real "reforming value" of the Lisbon Treaty. To avoid associations with the Constitutional Treaty, it was decided to retain the structure of two treaties: Treaty on European Union and Treaty on functioning of the European Union instead of replac ing them by one Treaty. The European Union will replace and succeed the European Community, thus becoming a coherent international organization equipped with legal personality. One of the consequences of this fundamental change will be the s sion of the three pillar structure of the EU, established in the Treaty of Maastricht e suppres in 1992. The paper examines modifications introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the following fields: the protection of fundamental rights (concentrating on the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the potential accession by the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights); the future Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, institutional changes (in the functioning of the European Council, Council, European Parliament, Commission, European Court of Justice and advisory bodies); the role of national parliaments, as well as changes brought to the substantial EC law (i.e. the suppression of the notion of "common market" or the addition f some new competences for the EU). The political reasons for not retaining some solutions proposed by the Constitutional Treaty and for adding some new modifications caused that the reform introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is certainly "milder" than the one planned in the Treaty estab lishing the Constitution for Europe. Many necessary institutional changes are post poned for several years and made dependant of the further unanimous decisions of the European Council. Some solutions concerning substantial law (like the suppres sion from the list of EU aims the protection of the undistorted competition) were introduced only to ease the ratification process in Member States of the EU (par ticularly France). This escape from the "shadow" of the Constitution for Europe reduced the reforming value of the Treaty of Lisbon. Certainly the main aim of the Constitution, namely the "simplification" of the system of EU law was not achieved. Still the authors are of the opinion that the reforms introduced by this Treaty were not apparent as they may lead to the better functioning of the European Union.

The EU Reform in the Treaty of Lisbon : the Horizontal and Systemic Changes

Yearbook of Polish European Studies 2007/2008, vol. 11, s. s. 139-155.

Współautorstwo: Kowalik-Bańczyk, Krystyna

Decyzje ramowe jako instrument harmonizacji prawa karnego w UE

Państwo i Prawo 2005, nr 7, s. 22-38.

Współpraca sądowa w sprawach karnych i współpraca policyjna w Traktacie ustanawiającym Konstytucję dla Europy

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 2005, nr 3/4, s. 27-37.

Komunikat Komisji Wspólnot Europejskich "W kierunku wzmocnionej kultury konsultacji i dialogu" : zasady ogólne i minimalne standardy konsultacji Komisji z zainteresowanymi stronami

Przegląd Legislacyjny 2005, nr 1, s. 152-172.

Czy Karta Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej rzeczywiście wpłynie na wzmocnienie statusu prawa wglądu do dokumentów instytucji Wspólnot Europejskich

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 2003, nr 3, s. 61-67.

Swoboda przepływu osób prawnych we Wspólnocie Europejskiej

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 2002, nr 1, s. 15-23.

Procedury i instrumenty zapewnienia jakości prawa Unii Europejskiej

Przegląd Legislacyjny 2002, nr 4, s. 64-79.

Warunki poprawnej implementacji dyrektyw w porządkach prawnych państw członkowskich w świetle prawa wspólnotowego

Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 2001, nr 1, s. 5-15.

Ograniczenia swobody zakładania przedsiębiorstw i świadczenia usług w świetle orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości

Studia Prawnicze 2001, nr 2, s. 83-107.

Omówiona w niniejszym artykule grupa orzeczeń należy niejako do trzeciej generacji orzecznictwa ETS. W pierwszej fazie Trybunał skupiał się na kwestiach dyskryminacji ze względu na narodowość. W drugiej fazie orzekał przede wszystkim w kontekście ograniczeń niedyskryminacyjnych, które mogły pogarszać sytuację podmiotów mających siedzibę lub miejsce zamieszkania w innym państwie członkowskim w stosunku do podmiotów krajowych. Wreszcie na początku lat 90.-tych Trybunał rozpoczął orzekanie case-by-case, co nie przeszkodziło jednak sformułować licznych istotnych reguł o charakterze ogólnym. Cechą charakterystyczną orzecznictwa Trybunału w latach 90.-tych jest stopniowe ujednolicanie podejścia w stosunku do ograniczeń swobody przepływu pracowników, zakładania przedsiębiorstw i świadczenia usług. Z jednej strony podejście takie jest niekiedy krytykowane, przede wszystkim dlatego, iż pociąga za sobą ryzyko zupełnie nieuzasadnionego jednakowego traktowania różnych sytuacji61. Z drugiej strony jasne jest, że sformułowana w sprawie Saeger v. Dennemeyer zasada podlega ścisłej interpretacji Trybunału i w związku z tym trudno uznać ją za dogodną „furtkę” dla stosowania wszelkich ograniczeń uzasadnionych interesem ogólnym. Przedstawione orzecznictwo dowodzi jednocześnie, że Trybunał gotowy jest odegrać aktywną rolę w kształtowaniu zakresu owych swobód oraz definiowaniu konieczności jego ochrony. Wydaje się jednak, że w sprawach dotyczących delikatnych i wrażliwych kwestii moralności i etyki, pozostawionych jak dotychczas wyłącznym kompetencjom państw członkowskich, Trybunał będzie skłonny przychylić się do argumentacji państw członkowskich, nawet jeżeli oznaczać to będzie zaniechanie poddania wprowadzonych przepisów badaniu pod kątem zasady proporcjonalności, tak jak w sprawie Schindler i Schindler. Podejście w tej sprawie zasadniczo kontrastuje z linią orzeczniczą sprawy Saeger v. Dennemeyer, w której wprowadzone środki były przedmiotem kontroli pod względem proporcjonalności do zamierzonych celów, jednakże potwierdza przekonanie, że w takich przypadkach Trybunał będzie ostrożny i niechętny wydawaniu orzeczeń niezgodnych z argumentacją państw członkowskich.

The group of judgements discussed in the article belongs to the so-called third generation ECJ case-law. In the first phase, the Court focused on discrimination issues based on nationality. In the second phase, it ruled primarily in the context of non-discriminatory restrictions that may have disadvantaged entities established in another member state towards national entities. Finally, in the early 1990s, the Court began to rule case-by-case, which did not, however, prevent it from formulating a number of important rules of a general nature. What was a characteristic feature of the Court's jurisprudence in the 1990s was a gradual unification of approaches in relation to restrictions on the freedom of movement of workers, establishment and provision of services. On the one hand, such an approach is sometimes criticised, mainly because it entails the risk of completely unjustified equal treatment of different situations. On the other hand, it is clear that the principle formulated in Saeger v. Dennemeyer is subject to strict interpretation by the Court and can therefore hardly be regarded as a convenient 'gateway' for the application of any restrictions justified by the general interest. At the same time, the presented case-law demonstrates that the Court is prepared to play an active role in shaping the scope of these freedoms and defining the need for its protection. It seems, however, that in cases involving sensitive and delicate questions of morality and ethics, so far left to the exclusive competence of the member states, the Court will be inclined to agree with the case presented by member states, even if this means not subjecting the introduced provisions to an examination of the principle of proportionality, as in the Schindler and Schindler case. The approach in this case is in stark contrast to the line of Saeger v. Dennemeyer, where the introduced measures were subject to scrutiny in terms of proportionality to the objectives pursued, but it confirms the belief that in such cases the Court will be cautious and reluctant to issue rulings contrary to the arguments of the member states.

Zasady wglądu do dokumentów instytucji Wspólnot Europejskich

Państwo i Prawo 2001, nr 11, s. 63-76.

Swoboda prowadzenia działalności na własny rachunek na podstawie Układu Europejskiego

Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego 2001, nr 3, s. 85-98.


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